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Abstract 
Carbon emission is generally viewed as the main cause of climate change. A lot of policies have been presented to 
control carbon emission all over the world. In this paper, a simple optimization model is developed to demonstrate 
that carbon emission constraint will restrain the firm from increasing its production under command-and-control 
regulation, which presents a motivation for the firm to break the command-and-control regulation. Then based on a 
game theory model between the regulator and the firm, we find that there are several factors which will impact their 
strategy about carbon emission abatement. Finally, some policy implications are presented to enhance climate policy 
efficiency. 
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1. Introduction 
In order to limit  global warming, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) noted that 
worldwide annual carbon emissions need to be cut approximately in half by 2050. A mix of d ifferent 
policy instruments has been conducted all over the world  to abate carbon emissions, such as command-
and-control, cap-and-penalty, cap-and-tax, cap-and-trade and a mix of these schemes.  
Command-and-control scheme is a forceful admin istrative method based on the regulator's power, in 
which carbon emitters cannot exceed a carbon emission allowance assigned by the regulator; otherwise, 
the emitter may be punished strictly or extremely in some cases. This kind of abatement scheme was 
widely used in the h istory and it probably will used by many countries such as China. Historically, the 
United States has trended to use command-and-control regulator approaches to control pollutants. This 
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approach includes requirements to use best available technology or other specific technology mandates. 
The most significant existing regulations for reduction of carbon emissions are probably the Corporate 
Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFE) standards, originally enacted in 1978, which mandate minimum fleet 
mileage standards for motor vehicles sold in the United States. 
There are only a few literatures on command-and-control regulations in recent years. Holling and Gary 
(1996) proposed that command-and-control is an alternative option for natural resource management. 
David (1998) analyzed the differences between command-and-control regulation and economic 
instruments, and he thought the two ways have advantages for each other. Daniel and Peter (1999) thought 
that command-and-control environmental regulations are not inherently inefficient or invariab ly less 
efficient than alternative economic instruments. And they show by elaborating a model through five 
stylized cases that command-and-control scheme can be and have been efficient (producing net social 
benefits), even more efficient in some cases than alternative economic instruments regimes. Linn (2008) 
discussed the tradable permit programs and command-and-control regulations on nitrogen oxides 
emission. For our best knowledge, there are almost no literatures  discussing on the command-and-control 
game between regulator and firm from the micro-level. 
This paper is trying to discuss the command-and-control regulation from the micro-level. In section 2, 
a simple optimization model is developed to demonstrate that command-and-control regulation  will put 
constraint upon firm’s production decision and its profits, so the firm has motivation to b reak the 
command-and-control regulat ion. Section 3 establishes a game theory model to analyze the strategies of 
regulator and the firm under the command-and-control scheme. In section 4, some policies implicat ions 
are presented based on the game model. And section 5 concludes. 
2. The impacts of command-and-control on firm’s production decision 
In this section we are try ing to clarify the impacts of command-and-control carbon abatement schemes 
on firms' producing plan by a simple model. Basically, in the model which we considered, there is a 
carbon-emission-dependent firm to make its producing plan under the carbon emission allowance 
assigned by the regulator for a g iven period. The firm must make it s optimal decision to maximize its net 
income. For the firm, the demand on its product is stochastic. Whether its amount of product exceeds or 
be short of the random demand, the firm has to take some cost. And on the other side, producing is 
companied by producing cost and carbon emission too. The fundamental notations are listed as follows. 
: the carbon emission allowance (CEA) assigned to the firm by the regulator for a given period. 
: the product price for per unit of product. It was assumed to be a constant for only a short term is 
considered. 
: producing cost for per unit of product. Generally speaking, exists. Otherwise, the firm has 
no motivation to produce any products. 
: inventory cost for per unit o f product during unit time if the amount of product exceeds the demand. 
For a given period, the total inventory cost is only decided by the amount of surplus of produ ct. 
: shortage cost (or opportunity cost) for per unit of product during unit time if the amount of product 
cannot meet the demand. It is same as inventory cost in that the total shortage cost is only dependent on 
the shortage for a given period. 
: the decision of amount of product in the given period. 
: amount of carbon emission for per unit of product. Hence, the total carbon emission in the given 
period is . 
:  the random demand of product, which  is assumed as a random, continuous variable with a 
probability density function  and a probability distribution function . And its 
expected mean value and variance is  
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respectively. 
Under the command-and-control scheme, the firm must arrange its producing policy under the forceful 
requirement of carbon emission constraint. The firm’s optimal product decision  is decided by 
maximizing its net income under the carbon emission constraint, i.e., 
 (1) 
It is obviously that the net income is stochastic variable because of the randomness of market demand. 
Hence, we will discuss firm’s optimal decision from the point v iew of expected net income. Based on the 
basic expectation calculation, from (1) the expected net income is  
                                          (2) 
where , , and . 
It should be noticed that the expected net income  is a continuous function with respect to . 
Therefore, the optimal decision can be achieved by its first  order condition as 
 (3) 
And because  and , so 
  
  
Hence there must exist a single point  makes (3) stand, which is 
                                                                            (4) 
And according to its second order condition,  
  
we can conclude that  is the optimal and single value making (2) maximized. However, considering the 
constraint from carbon emission regulation, the optimal decision under command -and-control scheme is 
                                                                      (5) 
From (5), we can find that there are two cases of firm’s optimal decision about its producing plan under 
the command-and-control scheme. In case I, the optimal decision is not limited by the CEA, so there are 
surplus of CEA. This case is not different with the case where there is no CEA co nstraint. In case II, the 
optimal decision is limited by the CEA, so there is a shortage of CEA. This means firm’s resources are 
not utilized  fully. And if the regulator relaxes the CEA constraint, the firm’s expected net income will be 
increased by raising its amount of production to . And this is why command-and-control scheme is not 
widely adopted. The hard constraint on firm’s decision will lead to inefficiency and market failure to 
some extent. 
To sum up, the command-and-control scheme put pressures on firms  to reduce their production 
amount in  order to reduce carbon emission. Hence, for the firm to maximize its profits, it has motivations 
to break the command-and-control regulation. So in the next section we will set up a game theory model 
to analyze the optimal strategy of them. 
3. The carbon game between regulator and firm 
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In this section, a simple game-theoretical model will be developed to analyze regulator’s and firm’s 
strategy about carbon emission abatement. We assume the regulator is responsible for making regulat ions 
on carbon emission abatement, which  is forceful for all firms. And we assume that all firms  are emission -
dependent and homogenous.  
The regulator has two strategies: strict control strategy  with cost of  or loose control strategy  
with cost of  while executing his responsibility. And we assume that . On the other side, the firm 
has two strategies: abating strategy  or not abating strategy  as well. And its business-as-usual (BAU)  
profit is denoted as  and the abatement cost is . We assume that the regulator can find out all not-
abating behaviors when the regulator use strict control strategy, and he will publish the failed firm with 
penalty as  and the firm must correct its behavior to abate carbon emission with BAU cost . For the 
firm who abates its carbon emission will promote its product quality and firm’s image and so on, and for 
the regulator, he can reduce the investment in environment protection from the firm’s abatement behavior. 
Therefore, the firm’s abatement strategy will p roduce positive effects for itself and the regulator. Let  is 
the positive profit for the firm and  for the regulator. Generally speaking,  holds. 
Based on the foregoing assumptions and notations, we can present the game between  the regulator and 
the firm as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. The carbon game between regulator and firms 
Firm 
Regulator Abating( ) Not-abating( ) 
Strict( )   
Loose( )   
In this game, if  holds, there exists a pure Nash equilibrium, i.e ., the regulator adopts 
loose control strategy  and the firm adopts not abating strategy . In this case, the abatement 
constraint is not actually working. Hence, to investigate their strategy choice under the abatement 
constraint, we assume that  always holds. 
When  holds, the carbon game does not have pure Nash equilibrium. We assume that 
the regulator will adopt strict control strategy with probability o f , then he will adopt loose control 
strategy with probability of . On the other side, the firm will adopt abating strategy with probability 
of  and not-abating strategy with probability of .  
For the regulator, its expected profit is  
 . 
According to its firs t order condition, we can get 
                                                                          (6) 
On the other side, the firm’s expected profit is  
 
And according to the first order condition, we can get  
                                               (7) 
Then according to (6) and (7), the expected profit of the regulator and the firm are 
                                                         (8) 
and 
                                                                   (9) 
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4. The policy implications of the solution 
As we expected, the Pareto equilibrium of the carbon game is that the regulator adopts loose cont rol 
strategy and the firm chooses the abating strategy. Hence, we will present some policies to achieve this 
Pareto equilibrium. According to (6), the firm whether to abate carbon emission is surprisingly not 
relative to its BAU profit and abatement cost directly. However, it depends on the ratio between   
and , where  is the cost difference between two regulator’s strategies and  is the 
opportunity income when he adopt strict control strategy. Hence, we v iew  as the strategy transfer 
resistance which describe the difficult ies for the regulator to transfer strict control strategy to loose 
control strategy and  as opportunity income. From (6), we can find that from the point view of the 
regulator he has following measures to increase the probability of the firm to abate carbon emission.  
1) To raise the strength of penalty for not abating.  From (6), it is easy to find that , so  
increases when  increases. When the regulator raise the penalty for not abating, the regulator act  as a 
hard and determinative agent to put forward carbon emission regulations, which set up a threat for all 
firms who do not put abatement into practice. Then the firm tends to abate carbon emission on its own 
initiat ive. Hence, this policy  can be viewed as a credib le strategy for the firm. On the other side, from (7) 
we will find that when  increased, the regulator is more tending to choose loose control strategy. 
Therefore this policy will make the carbon game achieve the Pareto equilibrium more probably. 
2) To decrease control cost and to raise supervision efficiency. This policy will decrease the regulator’s 
control cost and increase its expected income as shown in (8). And according to the assumption , 
the regulator should put more attention on the cost of strict control strategy. When the regulator cut down 
his control cost, the firm has a reason to believe that the regulator would check their carbon emission 
abatement activities more often and more widely, so this will p romote the probability for the firm to abate 
carbon emission more initiatively. 
3) And another way is to raise the positive effects of carbon emission. According to (6), when  is 
bigger  will be larger. So this policy to enlarge the positive effects of carbon emission, such as subsidy 
for green technology R&D, award for act ive carbon emission abatement, could promote the probability 
for firms to reduce carbon emission. On the other side, from (7) we can find that when  is large enough, 
the probability for regulator to adopt strict control strategy is decreasing. So we can conclude that this 
presented policy may push the carbon game to the Pareto equilibrium too. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we developed a simple optimizat ion model to demonstrate that under the command -and-
control regulation the regime may limit firm’s development and the firm has motivations to break the 
regulations. So we further put fo rward a game theory model to analyze reg ulator and firm’s optimal 
strategies under the command-and-control scheme. 
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